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Abstract
The Air Force relies on the application of new technologies to support and
execute its mission. As new technologies develop, the integration of that technology is
studied to determine the costs and benefits it may provide to the war fighter. One such
emergent technology is the Bluetooth wireless protocol, used to connect a small number
of devices over a short distance. The short distance is a feature that makes using the
protocol desirable. However short, there is still a vulnerability to interception.
This research identifies ranges at which several commercially available Bluetooth
devices are usable. Various combinations of both distance and orientation are varied to
determine a 360 degree map of the Bluetooth antenna. The map identifies distances at
which certain throughput thresholds are available. This research shows that baseline 1
mW Bluetooth antennas are capable of throughput levels of 100 kbps at over 40 meters,
which is four times the minimum distance specified in the protocol standard.
The 3Com PC card was the best performing PC card, capable of throughputs at or
near 100 kbps out to 40 meters. The other PC Cards tested had similar performance. The
Hawking USB dongle was the best USB antenna tested, achieving throughputs of over
200 kbps in three of the four orientation, and over 150 kbps at the fourth. The 3Com
dongle was a close second, the Belkin dongle a distant third, while the DLink antenna
was not able to achieve 100 kbps at any distance tested.

xi

THROUGHPUT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS OF
UNMODIFIED BLUETOOTH DEVICES
I. Introduction
1.1 Introduction
More so than the other services, the Air Force relies on the application of new
technologies to support and execute its mission. As new technologies develop, the
possible integration of that technology is studied to determine the costs and benefits it
may provide to the war fighter. One such emergent technology is the Bluetooth wireless
system.
Bluetooth is a wireless computing protocol designed to integrate devices within a
Personal Area Network (PAN). Created as a cable replacement technology, Bluetooth
allows devices to communicate with one another wirelessly, eliminating the need for
vendor specific cables and adapters. Being an open and public standard, Bluetooth can
be incorporated by any manufacturer who wants to communicate with other devices
wirelessly.
1.2 Background
As with any communications system, one of the chief concerns is the security of
the system. When using a wireless communications system, the primary cause for
security concerns are the possibility of signal interception by outside parties or
unauthorized access of the system. While Bluetooth is designed to operate as a short
range protocol, it is still vulnerable within that range.
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Bluetooth implements many techniques to mitigate the possibility of interception,
including frequency hopping and varying levels of encryption. Despite these efforts, it is
still susceptible to attack. One way to eliminate the threat from outsiders is to field the
system where the range of the network is enclosed within a secure area. To do so the
transmission capabilities of Bluetooth must be determined.
1.3 Research Focus
The goal of this research is to determine the actual throughput capabilities of
commercially available Bluetooth devices. By studying the performance of several
antennas at varied distances and orientations, the performance can be generalized to an
understanding of the capabilities of the Bluetooth wireless system as a whole.
The objective of this research is to develop a usability/vulnerability map for
general Bluetooth devices. Identifying the distances and orientations for specific
throughput levels will show both the capability of the Bluetooth system, as well as the
range of possible signal exploitation.
To realize this objective, a study of the published material concerning the
Bluetooth system and its performance forms a foundation for the research. With this
knowledge, experiments are designed and conducted to determine the performance of
assorted Bluetooth antennas. From that data a usability map is created to graphically
display the capabilities of each system. Finally, results are compared to form a
generalization of Bluetooth performance.
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1.4 Summary
This study determines the capabilities of general, commercial Bluetooth systems,
as an extension of the research conducted in [11]. The remainder of this document is
organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the relevant background on wireless computing,
the Bluetooth standard, wireless security, and Bluetooth specific security issues. Chapter
3 details the experimental methodology guiding this research. Chapter 4 provides the
results of the experiments and the analysis of that data. Finally Chapter 5 summarizes the
research and discusses conclusions drawn from it.
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2. Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter contains the background information on Bluetooth communication
devices. This chapter’s information mirrors and extends previous work of [11]. It
includes discussions of wireless computer communications, Bluetooth specific
communications, wireless security issues, and Bluetooth specific security concerns.
2.2 Wireless Computer Communications
Wireless computer communications use electromagnetic radio waves to transmit
information through the air. The signal’s bandwidth capacity is a function of the
frequency at which the antenna transmits. The higher the frequency of the signal, the
larger the data load the signal can carry. However the higher capacity frequencies have a
cost, namely the signal is more vulnerable to interference from atmospheric conditions.
The choice of transmission frequencies is not completely open, as international and
governmental agencies regulate frequency usage and allocation. In the United States,
frequency usage is managed by the Federal Communication Commission.
2.2.1 Wireless Network Compositions
As the use of wireless communications has matured, it has evolved into several
families of networks based upon the size and range of the network: local area networks
(LAN), personal area networks (PAN), and metropolitan area networks (MAN).
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2.2.2 Local Area Networks
Local area networks had their genesis in both industry and academia, possibly
being the most researched topic in recent wireless communications. Wireless LANs have
allowed business and students to be mobile within a campus area while still maintaining
connectivity to the network. With laptops becoming a more popular platform in
computing, mobile connectivity continues to grow in popularity. The ability of wireless
technologies to achieve comparable data rates with wired networks has also fueled its
acceptance.
2.2.3 The IEEE 802.11 Protocol Family
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has developed the
802.11 family of specifications for wireless local area networks. All of the specifications
in the 802.11 family “use the Ethernet protocol and CSMA/CA (carrier sense multiple
access with collision avoidance) for path sharing” [10].
802.11 was the first protocol in this family, formally specified in 1997 by IEEE.
Using phase shift keying modulation, it broadcasts in the 2.4 GHz unlicensed ISM
(Industrial, Scientific, and Medical) band using either Frequency Hopping Spread
Spectrum (FHSS) or Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS). This standard specified
a data rate of 1 to 2 Mbps on the network.
The 802.11a protocol “applies to wireless ATM systems and is used in access
hubs. 802.11a operates at radio frequencies between 5 GHz and 6 GHz. It uses a
modulation scheme known as orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) that

5

makes possible data speeds as high as 54 Mbps, but most commonly, communications
takes place at 6 Mbps, 12 Mbps, or 24 Mbps” [10].
The 802.11b standard is a backward compatible improvement upon the original
802.11. Also referred to as ‘Wi-Fi,’ 802.11b is the most common wireless protocol in
commercial use today. It provides data rates of up to 11 Mbps, operating in the 2.4 GHz
band. It modulates using complementary code keying (CCK) and broadcasts using
DSSS.
The 802.11e standard was developed to provide a better level of Quality of
Service (QoS) to the 802.11 family of protocols. The target of this standard is delaysensitive applications, such as Voice over IP (VoIP) or other streaming data.
802.11g is the newest standard in the family, focusing on improving the data rates
of 802.11b up to 54 Mbps in the same range as 802.11b. Like its predecessor, it also
transmits in the 2.4 GHz band.
2.2.4 Personal Area Networks
The scope of a PAN is limited to a single office setting. PANs integrate low
power devices within an office setting such as laptops, personal digital assistants (PDA),
digital cameras, and other small digital devices. Using a common wireless solution,
personal area networks can communicate without integrating various manufacturer cards,
wires, and plugs to connect these items.
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2.2.5 The IEEE 802.15 Protocol Family
IEEE 802.15.1 is the initial standard for wireless PAN implementation and the
first in the 802.15 family. It is based on the Bluetooth v1.1 specification, which transmits
in the 2.4 GHz band at rates up to 1 Mbps.
The 802.15.3 provides high data rates (20 Mbps and above) in the PAN arena
while operating with low power, as a low cost solution.
802.15.4 differs from other standards in the family by providing a low bandwidth,
personal area solution, with data rates near 20 kbps, 40 kbps, and 250 kbps. Like
802.15.3, it also focuses on “extra-low power MAC and physical layers” [15].
2.2.6 Metropolitan Area Networks and 802.16
Metropolitan Area Networks seek to connect both smaller LANs to larger
networks and the Internet, as well as connect individual users. The goal is to wirelessly
connect networks at ranges up to and beyond thirty miles. The 802.16 specification for
Broadband Wireless Access (BWA) is still under development, but has several
objectives.
The first is a wireless solution for replacing T1 lines in large areas. Many
businesses have to wait for these lines to be installed in their buildings. A long-range,
high bandwidth wireless solution could replace the need for expensive T1 lines, allowing
much quicker access to high speed connections.
The next focus is on consumer network connectivity, that is cable-based
connections and digital subscriber lines (DSL). A high rate wireless connection could
help solve availability problems seen in this market.
7

Finally, a sub-group of the 802.16 committee is investigating mobile metropolitan
connections: allowing individual users to remain connected to city wide networks as they
travel within the MAN’s broadcast range.
2.2.7 Transmission Methods
There are several different methods by which information can be transmitted over
wireless networks. Each way has its set of benefits over the other methods, but also
comes with its own deficiencies.
2.2.7.1 Narrow Band Radio
Narrow band radio transmissions occur within a specific frequency range. The
transmitter and receiver are tuned to the same frequency and stay there for the duration of
the connection. Because the signal is broadcast on that frequency, the possibility of
interception and interference is high.
2.2.7.2 Spread Spectrum
Signals transmitted using spread spectrum broadcast the data across a large span
of frequencies. Spread spectrum broadcasts are implemented using either Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum or Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum.
2.2.7.2.1 Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
In a direct sequence approach, each bit is spread over and transmitted on multiple
frequencies. “Spread spectrum broadcasts in bands where noise is prominent, but does
not rise above the noise” [14]. The data is spread across the frequencies based on a
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pseudorandom key generated to modulate the data stream. That bit stream must be
known by both parties, so they can both transmit and demodulate the signal.
2.2.7.2.2 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum
Unlike direct sequenced broadcasts, frequency hopping transmissions are sent on
only one frequency at a time. However, they differ from narrow band transmissions,
because the frequency changes multiple times over a given time period. Both the
transmitter and receivers must be synchronized to the same hopping pattern to
communicate. This reduces the chance of interference or interception by a third party.
2.3 Bluetooth
To “develop and promote a global solution for short-range wireless
communication operating in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz ISM band,” [4] Ericsson, IBM, Intel,
Nokia, and Toshiba joined to form the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) in late
1998. To better market this technology, the SIG opted to make the specification open
and royalty free, encouraging other companies to adopt it as a short range wireless
solution.
The name Bluetooth comes from “the Danish King Harald Blatand (Bluetooth),”
[3]. It was chosen because he is believed to have united the people of Denmark and
Norway during the 10th Century. In that spirit of unity, Bluetooth was developed as a
short-range network protocol designed to unite all the devices within a PAN.
The first version of the specification was made publicly available in the summer
of 1999. The adopter members had access to the specification before it was made public,
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so despite its seemingly initial incompleteness, there were working devices implementing
the Bluetooth standard just as the documentation hit the public. The promoter group has
grown since its inception to the size of nine, with 3Com, Lucent, Microsoft, and Motorola
joining in late 1999. The adopter group has also grown to over 3000 companies
worldwide, who have developed hundreds of Bluetooth devices. The specification is
currently in version 1.1, with two distinct parts: “[t]he core specification defining the
radio characteristics and the communication protocols for exchanging data between
devices over Bluetooth radio links,” [3] and “[t]he profile specification that defines how
the Bluetooth protocols are to be used to realize a number of selected applications” [3].
The Bluetooth standard was developed to replace the vendor and protocol specific
cables that run between different personal devices, such as PDAs, cellular phones, digital
cameras, laptop computers, and other devices. Many of these devices have unique
connectors that make integration a nightmare in a personal area network. Bluetooth
hopes to eliminate the need for these connectors, by utilizing a common, open wireless
standard to create these connections.
Devices adhering to the Bluetooth standard transmit in the 2.4 GHz ISM band,
“employing frequency-hopping (FH) spread spectrum technology to reduce interference
and fading” [16]. A time division duplex scheme is implemented, allowing for full
duplex communications in a wireless personal area network, known as a piconet. A
single piconet can support eight devices: one master and up to seven slaves. Bluetooth
piconets can support asynchronous data links with each slave device and synchronous
voice links with up to three slaves. The published range of a piconet is 10m when
10

transmitting at 1 mw EIRP. That range can be increased to 100m by increasing the
transmission power. Bluetooth devices support transmissions on these links at rates up to
1 Mbps.
The ISM frequency band ranges from 2.400 MHz to 2483.5 MHz in most
countries. Bluetooth operates in the 2402 MHz to 2480 MHz RF channels. Each channel
in the range is 1 MHz wide, giving Bluetooth 79 channels in which to transmit.
“Bluetooth radio hops from channel to channel at 1600 hops per second,” [16] giving the
network time slots of 625 microseconds. The sequence used in a piconet is unique to that
piconet, being “determined using an algorithm based on the address (and clock) of the
Bluetooth hub (master)” [16]. This hopping sequence is obtained by a slave once it has
synchronized with the master of the piconet.
Bluetooth radios modulate using a binary system of Gaussian Frequency Shift
Keying. It is utilized because of the better efficiency it provides above normal Frequency
Key Shifting. This aids the device in maintaining the proper signal characteristics for
Bluetooth transmissions. A simple comparison of Bluetooth and IEEE 802.11b can be
seen in Table 1.
2.3.1 Protocols
There are two categories of protocols in the Bluetooth protocol stack: transport
protocols and middleware protocols. These are not defined in the specification, but rather
are natural groupings of the protocol stack. The protocols in the transport group are
“developed exclusively for the Bluetooth wireless technology” [3]. All protocols
transmitting over a Bluetooth link access these protocols to communicate. Middleware
11

protocols are those which support other protocols and applications, allowing old and new
applications to use Bluetooth links to communicate, without knowledge of how the link
itself works. This widens the area in which Bluetooth can be applied. This also allows
“many applications already developed by vendors [to] take immediate advantage of
hardware and software systems which are compliant to the (Bluetooth) specification”
[12]. A diagram of the Bluetooth protocol stack is shown in Figure 1.
Table 1. IEEE 802.11 – Bluetooth comparison [16]
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Figure 1. Bluetooth Protocol Stack [3]
2.3.2 Transport Protocols
2.3.2.1 Radio Layer
This layer is discussed in the preceding sections.
2.3.2.2 Baseband Layer
The essential, low level functions of a Bluetooth piconet are defined by the
baseband layer. It controls the physical radio link of the device, piconet formation,
transmission resource sharing, and low level packet types. The creation of piconets is
managed in this layer through an inquiry and paging procedure that “synchronize[s] the
transmission hopping frequency” [12].
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For two Bluetooth devices to communicate, each must know two things: the
other’s Bluetooth device’s address (BD_ADDR) and the master device’s clock. The
BD_ADDR is a unique 48 bit address that is imprinted when the device is manufactured.
The BD_ADDR is “engraved on the Bluetooth hardware and it cannot be modified” [3].
The clock in each device is a 28 bit counter. The counter is incremented every 312.5
microseconds, “which corresponds to half the residence time in a frequency when the
radio hops at the nominal rate of 1,600 hops/sec” [3]. Once a device knows these two
pieces of data, it can communicate with the master and its piconet.
2.3.2.3 Piconet Formation
Bluetooth piconets exist in a truly ad hoc environment; there is no set
infrastructure for the piconet. The duration of a piconet’s existence is defined by the
network’s master and how long it deems a connection is necessary. Any given Bluetooth
device “may serve either as master or slave at different times” [3]. Even though a piconet
is comprised of up to seven slave devices, more than the seven slaves may be present
within the physical range of the piconet. Those devices present but not active in the
piconet are considered parked. Once a device has joined as a slave in a piconet, it may
negotiate with the master to become the new master.
The master of a piconet assigns a locally unique active member address
(AM_ADDR) to each active slave in the piconet. Those devices with the operating
range, but not active (i.e., in parked mode) and those outside the operating range (standby mode) do not have AM_ADDRs. With this address, the master controls transmissions
in the piconet. Two or more piconets may “exist in time and space independent of each
14

other” [3]. In fact, a single device may be a slave in more than one piconet at a time.
The resulting topology is known as a scatternet. A Bluetooth device can accomplish this,
provided its transmission slots from its first piconet do not overlap with its transmission
slots in its second, and subsequent, piconets. An example of Bluetooth devices in a
scatternet formation is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Bluetooth scatternet [3]

The devices in a piconet communicate by monitoring the sequence of frequency
hops, synchronized with one another. The time slot in which each device transmits is 625
microseconds, which corresponds to 1600 hops/sec. Transmissions must begin and end
15

within that time slot. The exception to this rule is for “long packets,” which can take
three or five slots each. The hopping sequence is suspended during these transmissions,
and then restarted where it would have been if only single slot packets were transmitted.
This frequency hopping sequence is based upon the master’s BM_ADDR and
clock. The master’s clock identifies the frequency currently transmitting. Knowing these
pieces of information, a slave can construct the hopping sequence for the piconet.
Because it is the identifier for the piconet’s hopping sequence, a master device can only
exist in its own piconet, even when its slaves are in a scatternet formation.
The slaves in a piconet are synchronized by the master’s clock. Each slave
determines and stores “the offset time between their own Bluetooth clock and that of their
master” [3] to keep synchronized to the master. The clock ticks twice per time slot, so
the slot is determined by the second least significant bit. This bit classifies the time slot
as even or odd, which determines whether it is the master’s or a slave’s turn to transmit.
This time division duplex (TDD) system alternates transmission authority
between the master and slaves. “The master transmits on the even number slots…, while
the slaves transmit on odd number slots” [3]. A slave must be contacted by the master in
order to transmit in the piconet. Once the master has initiated contact, the slave may
transmit in the next time slot. Any Bluetooth device can only transmit in one piconet at
any given time, although deconflicted time slots may be used by devices to participate in
several piconets.
Admission to a piconet is also controlled by the master. There is a two step
process which the master uses to finds new devices (inquiry) and allow devices into the
16

piconet (paging). The master broadcasts an inquiry message within its transmission
range to inform other Bluetooth devices of its presence. If any of those devices are
running an inquiry scan (looking for a master in discovery mode), they respond with a
packet containing that device’s BD_ADDR.
Once informed of the willing devices available, the master explicitly invites
devices to join the piconet by paging. During this transaction, the master gives the new
slave the hopping sequence information along with the slave’s AM_ADDR. If the master
has prior knowledge of devices near it, then it may bypass the inquiry phase and just page
those nearby components.
2.3.2.4 Connection Types
Bluetooth piconets allow both synchronous and asynchronous communications
between its devices. The asynchronous connectionless (ACL) links are used for data
traffic when the integrity of the data is important. The integrity is maintained “using
retransmissions and sequence numbers, as well as forward error correction (FEC) if
necessary” [3]. For synchronous traffic, up to three synchronous connection-oriented
(SCO) links can be created in a piconet. SCO links are used primarily for supporting
“periodic audio transmissions at 64 Kb/s in each direction” [3]. The integrity of these
transmissions is slightly less, because retransmissions do not occur over SCO links.
However, FEC mechanisms are used to recover from some identified errors.
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2.3.2.5 Baseband Packets
There are five baseband packet types: Identification (ID), POLL/NULL,
Frequency Hopping Sequence (FHS), ACL/SCO, and Data Voice (DV) packets as seen in
Figure 3. Each packet type begins with “an access code (AC) field, which is used to
distinguish transmissions in different piconets” [3]. Except for the ID packet, all of the
packet types also contain a header block. The FHS, ACL/SCO, and DV packets contain a
payload section.
The ID packet type is used during inquiry searches and synchronizations. The
POLL packet is used when a slave needs to be contacted, but there is no payload to be
delivered. The NULL packet type acts as a response when no payload is returned to the
master. The FHS packet type is used during piconet creation, by which the master passes
the appropriate BD_ADDR, AM_ADDR, and clock information to the new slave. The
ACL packet type is used to pass asynchronous data. The SCO packet type is used to pass
synchronous data. The DV packet type contains both ACL and SCO data, to be used
when a SCO link also needs ACL type data transferred.
Each packet type contains multiple fields. The AM_ADDR field is used to
identify “the destination slave of a master transmission or the source slave of a slave
transmission” [3]. A Bluetooth master can broadcast messages to all of its slaves by
setting the AM_ADDR to b’000’. The PDU_type field identifies the baseband packet
type in which it is contained. The flags field is used in ACL packets to do flow control
and retransmissions, using “a stop-and-go ARQ scheme and a 1-bit sequence number”
[4]. The HEC provides a means to protect this header from errors in transit.
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Figure 3. Baseband packet types [3]
The ACL payload is further decomposed into a header, a body, and a 16 bit CRC.
The header has a logical channel field (L_CH) which routes the packet through the low
levels of the protocol stack. When L_CH = b’11’, the packet is used by the link manager
to configue the piconet. When L_CH=b’01’ or b’10’, then L2CAP receives the packet.
2.3.2.6 Link Manager Protocol
The Link Manager Protocol (LMP) is a transactional protocol, responsible for
setting up the properties of and controlling the Bluetooth link, to include authentication
and encryption of the link. Bluetooth devices in a piconet can “authenticate another
device through a challenge/response mechanism” [3], allowing the link to be encrypted
once the connection is deemed authentic. The LMPs are responsible for negotiating
amongst themselves, to determine which device provides what services.
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LMP packets are transmitted in the ACL packet format. They are identified as
such by the logical channel L_CH set to b’11’ as seen in Figure 4. The LMP packet
header is 8 bits long, with the first bit determining the packets sender. The transaction
identifier (tr_ID) is ‘0,’ the master sent the packet. If the tr_ID is ‘1,’ then a slave sent
the packet.

Figure 4. LMP packet type [3]
Authentication and encryption of Bluetooth connections is the responsibility of
the LMP. The authentication protocol can be initiated by either device at any time during
communication. The authentication procedure is “a challenge/response mechanism based
on a commonly shared secret, a link key generated through a user-provided PIN” [3].
The process is begun by the challenger sending a challenge packet, which contains a
random number. The claimant receives that packet and generates a response using a 128bit authentication key. The claimant responds with the new number, where the
challenger compares it to an expected result. A match confirms the identity of the
claimant.
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Once devices have authenticated, the encryption process may begin. Encryption
on piconets covers both ACL and SCO links. Authenticated Bluetooth links generate a
series of encryption keys from link key. These keys are controlled by the LMP, but
SAFER+ algorithm is used in the baseband to encrypt the data. Along with the device’s
Bluetooth address and the master’s clock, these keys are used to encrypt the body of the
Bluetooth packets. This encryption runs in 3 modes. Mode 1 consists of no security at
all. Mode 2 runs application level security/encryption of packets. Mode 3 hardware
encrypts all traffic on link from the time the link is established.
The low power modes (sniff, hold, and park) of Bluetooth devices are controlled
with LMP transactions. Sniff mode is when a Bluetooth device listens periodically for
master transmissions per an agreement between the two devices. This agreement is
decided through LMP interactions. Hold mode is a temporary pause in a slave’s
involvement in a piconet. This mode is activated when “a device agrees with its [master]
to remain silent for a given amount of time” [3]. During this pause, the slave device still
maintains its AM_ADDR.
In park mode, the AM_ADDR is surrendered by the slave. The slave remains
silent until informed it can return to the piconet by the master device. A parked device
may negotiate to return to the piconet prior to being invited back by the master. This is
accomplished by replying to the master’s beacon transmissions. Despite being in a low
power mode, the Bluetooth device can still perform operations. Low power modes only
affect a particular piconet. If the device is in a scatternet configuration, it can be active in
one piconet and in a low power mode in another.
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2.3.2.7 Host Controller Interface
The Host Controller Interface (HCI) is an abstraction layer in a Bluetooth device,
not a protocol itself. Through the HCI, a host device communicates with its Bluetooth
baseband layer. The HCI is “an interface for host devices to access the lower layers of
the Bluetooth stack through a standardized interface” [3]. Through this interface, a host
device can request to connect to a specific Bluetooth device, activate low power modes,
initiate authentication, and other functions of the device. The capabilities of the
Bluetooth card are limited to the HCI command set to which the host device has access.
2.3.2.8 Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol
To further abstract the hardware implementation details from the host device, the
Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) exists just above the Host
Controller Interface. “The concepts of master and slave devices” no longer exist at the
L2CAP level in the protocol stack [3]. The multiple channels of ACL links are
multiplexed through the L2CAP layer for master devices. SCO links do not interact with
the L2CAP, but rather are passed straight to the baseband layer.
L2CAP packets are often larger than the packet sizes supported by the lower
levels. To account for this possible discrepancy, the L2CAP layer supports segmentation
of its own packets. If the packet is segmented, the L_CH field in the ACL_pkt_hdr is set
to b’10’, identifying the packet as the first in the segmentation. In all following packets
in that segmentation, the ACL_pkt_hdr is set to b’01’. L2CAP payloads can be
configured as a signaling packet, a connection oriented payload, or a connectionless
payload.
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2.3.3 Middleware Protocols
2.3.3.1 Service Directory Protocol
Bluetooth was created to be wide-ranging wireless enabling standard with the
ability to cover a large number of applications. To determine what applications or
services a device can offer, Bluetooth provides the Service Directory Protocol (SDP).
Through the SDP, devices can poll one another to establish which devices have what
services to offer. The SDP does not provide the services itself; rather it is only a provider
of information.
2.3.3.2 Radio Frequency Communication
To support serial communications protocols, Bluetooth devices have an
RFCOMM emulator. The RFCOMM “emulates RS-232 control and data signals over the
Bluetooth baseband” [12], emulating the ETSI 07.10 serial specification. With this
middleware protocol, Bluetooth devices can support legacy serial communication
applications without modifications of the legacy system.
2.3.3.3 Telephony Control Signaling
The Telephony Control Signaling (TCS) middleware protocol allows Bluetooth to
access telephone applications. It consists of two command sets: the AT set (TCS-AT)
and the binary set (TCS-BIN). The AT command set is run through RFCOMM, being a
serial command set. The same commands can also control mobile phones and modems.
The TCS-BIN command set is a binary encoding run on top of L2CAP, supporting
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“normal telephony control functions such as placing and terminating a call, and sensing
ring tones” [3]. TCS-BIN can also control broadcast, point-to-multipoint signals.
2.3.3.4 Adopted Protocols
Bluetooth also includes support for other common protocols, such as TCP/IP.
Given this support for current and legacy applications, Bluetooth proves to be a flexible
and formidable wireless communications standard.
2.3.4 Bluetooth Performance
Several studies have been conducted since the release of the Bluetooth
specification seeking to evaluate and improve the technology and its capabilities. These
studies have varied from antenna design and manufacturing [2] [18], to field environment
tests [1], and performance analysis of the Bluetooth channel [9] [13] [17].
The Bluetooth specification shows that the selection of packet types greatly
affects the throughput capabilities of Bluetooth communications. This variability is
shown in Table 2. The Bluetooth devices determine the type of packets used in
transmission based on a determination of the signal strength. Weaker signals outside the
“golden range” of the device use packet types of smaller size and greater error correction.
Stronger signals use packets of greater size and less error correction, on the presumption
that the better signal is less likely to create errors. Studies have found throughput
performance correlations between packet selection and both signal to noise ratio [17] and
bit error rate [9].
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Table 2. Packet type throughput variations [4]

The throughput rates shown in Table 2 are maximums, assuming no
retransmissions or uncorrectable errors in the system. The Bluetooth specification
requires that the signal be receivable at ten meters. Throughput levels in excess of 300
kbps are possible at twenty meters and 200 kbps at thirty meters [11].
2.4 Wireless Security Issues
As in any trusted environment, the security of a computer network is an important
factor in its design and implementation. The main areas of concern when securing a
network are the authentication of the users, the availability of the network, and the
confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation of the data.
•

The authentication of users on a network ensures that only those people who
should be on the network are on the network. Unauthorized access to a trusted
network could enable an enemy to access sensitive information and/or systems.
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•

Availability of a network ensures that when the user needs the resources of the
network, he can access them. Not only is the network available during normal
usage, but also is survivable when under external stress, such as in a denial of
service attack.

•

Confidentiality of a network is necessary for the users to trust the system and one
another. Without it, the data passed on the network may be acquired by
unauthorized users.

•

Integrity of the network’s data ensures that the information has not been
corrupted. Maintaining the integrity of the data involves both defending against
malicious attacks as well as dealing with accidental failures of the system.

•

Non-repudiation of the network’s messages ensures that what happens on a
network cannot be erased. A user sending a message cannot deny that the
message was sent. This gives accountability to the system.
Computer networks operating in a wireless environment pose several security

threats inherent to the transmission medium. The first of these is interference. A simple
understanding of what transmission scheme is being used would allow an enemy to
execute an effective jamming operation, denying access to the network. While spread
spectrum technologies mitigate the likelihood of this, they do not defend against it
completely.
Another vulnerability inherent to a wireless medium is signal interception, or
eavesdropping. Unlike a traditional wired network where the transmission lines are
fixed, a wireless network broadcasts over an area correlated to the transmitter’s power
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level. Any receiver in the coverage area can receive the signal. If the signal is not
properly secured, an enemy could passively listen to the transmissions violating the
network’s confidentiality. Through various active attacks on the wireless network, an
enemy could violate the network’s availability, integrity, authentication, and
nonrepudiation.
Many wireless networks are extensions of preexisting wired networks installed for
the convenience of users. With this topology, the central access point is a large
vulnerability, possibly being a single point of failure for the wireless portion of the
network. While these wireless extended networks suffer from this weakness, ad hoc
wireless networks do not. Being distributed in nature, these networks can often survive
when a single node is brought down. This distribution of control helps ensure the
survivability of the network.
Finally, the composition of wireless networks tends to be dynamic, even over
short periods of time. Wireless networks are often implemented to give users mobility
without losing connections. Because of the frequency of adding and dropping nodes in
the network’s topology, authentication becomes paramount in establishing and
maintaining trust in the network. All of these factors must be considered when securing a
wireless computer network.
2.5 Bluetooth Security Issues
Bluetooth enabled systems have some vulnerabilities that, if overlooked, could
pose as a threat to the security of a piconet. These weaknesses can be classified into
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several categories: eavesdropping and impersonation, location attacks, hopping attacks,
cipher attacks, invalid states, and traffic exposure.
2.5.1 Eavesdropping and Impersonation
Eavesdropping and impersonation attacks require an attacker to acquire the
initialization key of a Bluetooth device, which is used in the encryption process. This
initialization key is derived from a PIN, a random number (computed from the device’s
authentication process), and the device’s Bluetooth address (BD_ADDR). The last two
can be intercepted easily, because they are broadcast in the clear. The PIN must be
entered into both devices by their users. The first flaw is that the PIN has a default value
of zero. If this is not changed, the initialization key can be easily determined and the
link’s encryption broken.
This PIN crunching can be used in two ways. In the first, an attacker must use an
exhaustive search to guess all the possible PINs. From this list of possible PINs, the
attacker attempts a verification process with the guessed PIN. This process is repeated
until a successful verification is accomplished. This process is called “eavesdropping on
the key establishment process” [8].
In the second scenario, the attacker takes a guessed PIN and tries to initialize a
connection with the victim device by beginning the challenge-response protocol. Like
the eavesdropping attack, this is repeated until a selected PIN returns a ‘correct’ response
from the victim. This verified PIN is used to complete the key establishment protocol.
To counter PIN guessing, Bluetooth devices use an exponential back-off process to delay
the time between guesses allowed. While it may keep attacks at bay longer, it also allows
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more time for the attacker to generate more PINs. This is called “stealing by
participation” [8].
The link key and encryption keys are derived from the initialization key. Because
of this, maintaining the secrecy of the device’s PIN is essential. Once this is discovered,
and enemy can impersonate that device. Having the initialization key, the attacker can
contact other devices and acquire their links keys. By knowing the link keys, the attacker
can impersonate these devices. A “man-in-the-middle” attack can be initiated by
contacting two devices acting as one to the other. Both devices think that they are
communicating with one another, and that the other has initiated the contact.
Communications between the two now pass through the attacker, who can both read it
and change it, if desired.
2.5.2 Location Attacks
Bluetooth devices that are in discovery mode respond to other devices with their
Bluetooth address (BD_ADDR). Knowing this, an attacker can determine both the
current location and the movements of a victim device. If the identity of the owner of the
Bluetooth device is known, that connection can be used to track the owner. Because the
BD_ADDR is an address permanently imprinted at the time of manufacturing, tracking a
device and its associations cannot be prevented.
Changing power modes by a Bluetooth device can be controlled by the
application layer of a device. Thus, malicious software can force a device into low power
modes that scan for other devices in its area. The victim of such an attack will announce
its presence which the attacker can track.
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2.5.3 Hopping Along
The hopping pattern a Bluetooth device follows makes it difficult for an attacker
to intercept Bluetooth transmissions. The attacker must either listen to all 79 channels
simultaneously or hop along with the piconet master’s sequence. To hop along with the
master, an attacker must learn the pattern or the seed used to generate the hopping
sequence.
The hopping sequence is determined by the clock and address of the master.
When a device is in inquiry mode (not currently part of a piconet), the hopping sequence
it uses is based on its own clock and a general inquiry access code which is common to
all devices. During inquiry, a device transmits its clock and BD_ADDR. An attacker
could scan the bands reserved for inquiry and eavesdrop. When the device is connected
(part of a piconet), the hopping sequence is determined by the master, using both the
master’s BD_ADDR and clock. Piconet masters transmit their BD_ADDRs and clocks
when they page devices. These transmissions could also be intercepted, giving the
attacker the information necessary to follow the hopping sequence.
2.5.4 Cipher Attacks
Transmissions on a Bluetooth link can be encrypted. The basis for this encryption
is “[an] encryption key KC, the 48-bit BD_ADDR, the master clock bits CLK26-1, and a
128-bit RAND value” [4]. From these four inputs, four linear feedback shift registers
(LFSR) of size 25, 31, 33, and 39 bits are initialized to compute the encryption cipher.
To determine the encryption key, the inputs to the four LFSRs must be known.
“An attacker can guess the content of the registers of the three smaller LFSRs and the
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summation register with a probability of 2-93” [8]. The contents of the largest LFSR can
be determined from the outputs of the other LFSRs and the summation register. The
output from the guess is compared to the actual transmission to determine the correctness
of the guess. While this still a laborious process, it is considerably better than the 2128
required to exhaustively brute force through the encryption cipher.
2.5.5 Invalid States
The Bluetooth model has to guard against being caught in one of several possible
invalid states found in various levels of the device. The link controller of a Bluetooth
device can be in one of nine different states: one of two high level states or one of seven
transitional states, as seen in Figure 5 [6].

Figure 5. Link controller state diagram [6]
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The two high level states can be determined by a single bit with no possible invalid
states. However, three bits are needed to represent the seven transitional states. This
leaves one state that needs to be guarded against. A manufacturer’s design should be able
to safely escape this state into a stable one to prevent unknown activity.
There are four possible states for the encryption of traffic. Hardware needs to
avoid going into the invalid state of encrypted broadcast traffic and unencrypted unicast
traffic. This would allow an outside device to listen to directed traffic while broadcast
traffic is unavailable. The issue is not the encrypted broadcast data, but the availability of
unicast data while some encryption is being used.
2.5.6 Traffic Exposure Issues
Data can be exposed to unauthorized parties when a slave and a master negotiate
to change roles. This transfer time can leave data available to unwanted recipients, or
even lost. If the master disables encryption during the switch, either traffic from the
slave could be encrypted and received by no one, or unencrypted and readable by
everyone. Either situation leaves the data in a situation not desired at the beginning of
the transmission [6].
The link key scheme used by Bluetooth can also pose an exposure problem. The
problem is illustrated in Figure 6. Device A uses its link as the basis for encryption for
data passed between A and B. Device A uses that same link key to encrypt traffic
between A and C. B can now listen to C’s traffic, and even pose as C if it chose to do so
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[16]. The solution is for A to have a better key management system, but this grows in
complexity with the size of the piconet (or even worse for a scatternet).

'©^^ ©
©
Figure 6. Link key traffic interception [6]
2.6 Summary
This chapter reviewed the topics necessary for understanding of Bluetooth
wireless systems. First, wireless communications and the IEEE family of specifications
governing it were discussed. Second, Bluetooth communications and its implementation
were presented in detail. Third, security concerns in wireless communications were
discussed. Finally, security vulnerabilities specific to Bluetooth systems were outlined.
The next chapter presents the experimental methodology.
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3. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the methods in the experiment, as well as how the data is
collected and analyzed. This methodology parallels the work of Capt Tim Kneeland [11].
Doing this serves as both a validation of his work and extensions to that work, to further
understand Bluetooth systems.
3.2 Problem Definition
The purpose of this study is to determine the effective range of Bluetooth wireless
networks in an open air environment. This experiment evaluates several Bluetooth
devices at various ranges and orientations to determine this distance.
3.2.1 Goals
This study develops a generic usability “map” for Bluetooth enabled systems.
This map, similar to a physical topological map, identifies the maximum range of a
Bluetooth transmitter-receiver pair. This not only indicates the maximum usable distance
between the devices, but also the range at which the devices are vulnerable to
interception.
3.2.2 Approach
The map is constructed by measuring the throughput capacity of pairs of various
vendors’ Bluetooth antennas. A systematic combination of several different vendor
antennas, with throughput measured at various ranges and antenna orientations are used
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to accumulate data on the capabilities of Bluetooth transceivers. The transmitting
antenna, receiving antenna, distance between the two, and relative antenna orientation are
varied. The data gathered from this sample of unmodified commercially available
Bluetooth transceivers is used to infer the performance of Bluetooth systems as a whole.
3.3 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) is the Bluetooth channel, from transmitting
antenna to receiving antenna, including the radio waves themselves. Within this system,
the packets submitted to the Bluetooth protocol stack constitute the load offered to the
system. All other components are either inputs or support elements to the SUT.
Within this SUT, the component under test (CUT) is the transmission capability
of the transmitting antenna. The distance at which the Bluetooth antenna is able to
transmit defines its usability/vulnerability range.
This experiment is designed to infer a maximum range at which two Bluetooth
devices can communicate and are vulnerable to interception. The resulting distances are
the best case for a piconet’s transmissions. The addition of more devices to the piconet
or the addition of barriers (as would be found in an office setting) will decrease the
maximum range capability of the Bluetooth device.
3.4 System Services
The system provides the capability to transmit data wirelessly between two nodes.
The system provides a successful transmission if the data is received with no errors, or if
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the errors are correctable by the receiver. The system fails if either there is no data
received or if there are errors that the receiver cannot.
Only successful trials of the system are considered in the data. A failure of the
system is of no use in this study, with one exception. The failure that represents the
antenna pair’s inability to communicate over that distance or further is noted as that
antenna pair’s maximum distance.
3.5 Performance Metrics
The performance metric used to evaluate the system is throughput. Throughput,
defined as the number of bits transmitted divided by the measurement period, measures
the ability of the SUT to transmit data across the link. The amount of data successfully
(errorless or corrected errors) transmitted per unit time is throughput. A failure of the
system is identified by an unusually low throughput (high number of uncorrectable
errors) or a zero throughput.
3.6 Parameters
This section describes the parameters involved in the experiment, both for the
system and the workload.
3.6.1 System Parameters
o Antenna orientation – The radiation pattern of an antenna is not omnidirectional, but varies according to the position of the receiver. Thus, the
distance at which a signal is receivable will be affected by the position of
the respective antennas.
o Antenna types – Different vendor antenna configurations are likely to produce
variations in the performance of the Bluetooth link. The antenna shape,
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encasing, and manufacturing could all affect the device’s transmission
capabilities.
o Distance – The distance between antennas will affect the throughput of the
wireless system. With the power level fixed at 1 mW, there is a finite
distance at which the signal is receivable. The strength and reliability of a
wireless signal decreases proportionally to this distance.
o EM interference –Bluetooth devices operate in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz band.
There are many other devices operating within these same frequencies and
these devices could create scrambling or destructive interference of the
Bluetooth signal. Errors caused by these transmissions will decrease the
throughput of the Bluetooth transmission.
o Environmental Factors – Variations in barometric pressure, humidity,
temperature, and other environmental factors can affect the Bluetooth
signal by causing attenuation, path loss, or reflection of the signal.
3.6.2 Workload Parameters
o Packet Type – The antennas used in [11] came with software that conditioned
the packet stream to use DM5 packets almost exclusively in their
transmissions, through file transfer software included as part of the
installation. Not all manufacturers use this software; most manufacturers
force the use of Windows Explorer® to execute the transmissions. These
signals vary in packet type, from DM1 to DH5 based upon the signal
strength.
3.7 Factors
o Antenna orientation - (360, 90, 180, 270 degrees) – The levels for the antenna
orientation were selected to cover 360 degrees around the transceiver.
These levels are consistent with the previous work in [11]. The gain of
most antennas is not uniform; therefore the antennas’ orientation is
expected to be a significant factor in the usable range of the device. The
orientations of the two laptops relative to one another, along with the
rotations of the transmitter, are shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Transmitter/Receiver Laptop Orientations
o Distance – (five meter increments, one meter fine-tunings) – The five meter
increments allow the expected range to be traversed rather quickly. The
one meter refinements better define where the throughput levels pass
certain thresholds (300, 200, 100 kbps, and failure). Due to path loss and
signal attenuation, the distance between the two devices is expected to
account for the largest percentage of variation in the experiment.
o Vendor Antennas – The different antennas represent a sample of the Bluetooth
transceivers available commercially. The number of different devices
generalizes these results to most Bluetooth devices. It is suspected that the
device manufacturing has an effect upon the system’s throughput
capabilities and range. Specific details concerning the antennas used can
be found in Appendix A.
The remaining parameters (possible electromagnetic interference and
environmental-related factors) not varied are held as close to constant as possible. Being
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environmental factors, they cannot truly be held constant without facilities well beyond
the scope of this study. An effort is made to perform testing in conditions as close to
constant as possible. It is expected that some of the resulting error is attributable to these
environmental parameters.
3.8. Evaluation Technique
The evaluation technique used for this experiment is a direct measurement of the
system. This evaluation technique is selected for several reasons. Since the true effect of
the factors on the system’s performance is unknown, a valid simulator for Bluetooth
networks is unavailable. Direct measurement of a Bluetooth system correlates the factors
to the performance metrics. This method is also valid because it is the best case scenario
of an implemented Bluetooth network, which is the focus of this study.
3.9 Workload
The workload offered to the system is a 1000 KB text file. This has several
advantages. The first is the ease of throughput calculations given a file of this size. This
also allows the transfer to run long enough to achieve reliable results for the throughput
measurement. The minimum amount of time needed to transmit the file is
8bits
)
1byte
= 11.07 seconds, using solely DH5 packets. As the packet type varies,
723.2kbps

1001KB (

so will the best case throughput. As seen in Table 2, one-way throughput is highly
dependent upon the packet type chosen by the transmitter. The best possible case
throughput uses DH5 packets. This time represents the minimum necessary for a file to
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be transmitted, and many of the trials are expected to take longer as the signal degrades.
This workload is applied until the file transmission is complete.
3.10 Experimental Design
The experimental design for the throughput tests is a three factor, full factorial
design with replications. A full factorial design with replications means the effect of
each factor, effect of the interactions, and the effect due to experimental error can be
separated from one another and be quantified. The number of trials for each orientation
is variable, because each orientation is likely to fail at different distances. The best result
is chosen from r iterations of experiment, to find the maximum range at which
throughput level can be attained.
While the best case range is of primary interest, the mean of these replications is
of interest to determine the statistical significance at each distance and orientation.
Assuming a normal distribution of error and a 95% confidence (z = 1.645, α = 5), the
number of replications, r, required is given by r = (

164.5s 2
) [17], where s is the sample
5x

standard deviation and x is the mean of the sample. Each experiment is initially
performed three times. From this sample, r is calculated and more replications are run
until the desired confidence interval width is reached.
3.11 Experimental Setup

For each experiment, two laptops were arranged on wooden stools (0.6318 meters
tall) in the orientations shown in Figure 7. A wooden stool was used to minimize
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possible interference that metal stools may have produced. The distance between the
laptops is measured and fixed for each experiment.
For each distance-orientation pair, the test file is transmitted at least three times.
The packet level traffic for each successful transmission is captured by the CATC Merlin
Protocol Analyzer [5]. This transmission sequence is analyzed to determine the
throughput for the file transfer.
3.12 Results Analysis and Interpretation

The percentage that each factor contributes to the throughput can be determined
from the data using analysis of variance (ANOVA). The mean square of each effect
(MSx) is calculated from its sum of squares (SSx) and its degrees of freedom (vx). The
mean square of the error (MSE) is calculated the same way. The ratio of the two
(MSx/MSE) is the computed F-value. If this value is greater than the F curve defined by
F(0.95, vx, ve), then factor x is significantly different than the error [7]. As mentioned
above, the number of replications will be increased to ensure significance between levels
of the experiment.
3.13 Summary

This chapter discussed the experimental methodology for testing the best case
usable distance between two Bluetooth wireless devices. The goals and approach used in
this experiment were presented, followed by a definition of the system and component
under test. Next, a discussion of the parameters and factors varied in the experiment is
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given. This is followed by a definition of the workload and experimental methodology.
Finally, a description of the data analysis is presented.
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4. Analysis and Results
4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the results from the throughput experiments performed on
each of the antennas, as well as analysis of the data collected. This data is first
generalized to each of the two general antenna types (PC Card and USB Dongle). Details
of each individual antenna are then presented.
For all tests, a Dell Inspiron 8200 running Windows 2000 is the transmitting
device. When facing this laptop, the PC cards extend from the right hand side of the
keyboard. The USB dongle extends from the back of the laptop, on the left hand side.
The receiving device is a Dell Latitude D600, also running Windows 2000. In this
laptop, the PC card extends from the left hand side of the keyboard. The USB dongles
extend from the back of the laptop, on the right hand edge.
The throughput levels are calculated by finding the time stamp on the first packet
containing information from the test file, as well as the last. The size of the file is known,
so the throughput is determined by simply dividing that size by the difference in time
stamps of the last and first packets. The throughput calculator within Merlin is not used
since it does not account for retransmissions of packets.
Throughput measurements are only performed out to 40 meters; a physical
limitation of the indoor testing environment. Any cards whose thresholds for various
throughput values exceeded this distance are noted in the analysis, but those lines are not
shown in the maps presented.

43

4.2 Antenna Types
4.2.1 PC Cards

As a group, the PC cards performed quite similar to one another. Despite this
similarity, the 3Com PC card performed the best. This may be due to the unique physical
design of the 3Com antenna, which folds out of the plane of the card itself. However, the
performance cannot be completely attributed to this physical difference, as the Belkin PC
card (which does not have this antenna feature) performed almost as well as than the
3Com antenna. Both were able to transmit out to 40 meters, with 3Com’s performance
better at that distance. The Anycom antenna performed close to these two, but only had
one orientation (360 degrees) that transmitted at 40 meters. The other orientations failed
beyond 35 meters.
The amount of variance attributed to the manufacturer was only 0.1386%, and
that was only significant to a 60% confidence. The majority of the variance was
attributed to the distance (78.81%) and to the interaction between the distance and the
manufacturer (11.00%). The orientation of the antenna only affected the variance when
combined with the manufacturer and distance, and it was only 9.00% at that.
4.2.1.1 3Com PC Card

The 3Com PC card has an unusual feature; an antenna that flips up out of the
plane of the card itself. It is possible that this feature is what contributed to the card’s
ability to transmit at over 100 kbps beyond 40 meters, the largest distance tested. Its
transmission failure range is therefore unknown. The effect of the antenna extending to a
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different plane than the other PC cards could be determined by running more tests, some
where the antenna is extended and some where it is not.
The 90 degree orientation is the best at the 200 kbps level, successfully achieving
that throughput at 20 meters. The 270 degree orientation is the best at the 100 kbps, with
a distance of at least 40 meters. The specific data for each device can be found in
Appendix A. For the 3Com PC card alone, the distance between the devices was the
most significant factors, accounting for 84.5% of the variation. The interaction of the
distance and orientation accounts for 6.3%, while the orientation alone accounts for 3.7%.
Figure 8 below shows a graphical throughput representation for the different orientations.

Figure 8. 3Com PC Card throughput ranges
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4.2.1.2 Anycom PC Card

The Anycom PC card comes with a different software set than used by the other
devices in this study. The file transfer software preconditions the packet stream for
transmission. As a result, all the data packets broadcast have the DM5 packet type. This
could affect the throughput levels because both the data block size and error correction
level of this type packets are fixed. The distance at which the Anycom cards can
successfully broadcast is shorter than the other two PC card antennas. Perhaps the
retransmission of large blocks of data is the contributing factor, given that the number of
packets with errors increases as the distance between the devices increases. Because the
file transfer software for this card forces the data packets to be DM5s, this hypothesis
cannot be tested without modifications to the software.
As shown in Figure 9, the 90 degree orientation is best at both the 300 and 100
kbps levels, producing ranges for each out to 10 and 30 meters, respectively. The 360
degree orientation is the best at the 200 kbps and failure levels. The 200 kbps level is
possible at 25 meters, while the orientation fails out beyond 40 meters. Again, the
distance between the devices is the dominating effect, causing 91.5% of the variation.
The interaction between the distance and orientation accounts for 7.1% of the change,
while the orientation alone accounts for less than one percent.
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Figure 9. Anycom PC Card throughput ranges
4.2.1.3 Belkin PC Card

As shown in Figure 10 below, the 180 degree orientation is just slightly (less than
1 kbps) better than the 90 degree orientation, achieving the 300 kbps level at 10 meters.
The 300 kbps line is flat for the 270 and 360 degree orientations because the antenna did
not achieve throughputs of 300 kbps at any distance measured for those orientations.
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This same anomaly occurs in the 3Com USB dongle’s map. The 360 degree orientation
is the best for the 200 and 100 kbps levels, transmitting at those levels at 25 and 30
meters, respectively. All orientations transmitted beyond the 40 meter mark, with the 90
degree orientation having the highest throughput at that distance. Similar to the 3Com
antenna, the true failure distance is not known. Like the other two PC cards, the distance
between the Belkin cards is the greatest contributor to the variation, accounting for 89.5%
of it. Likewise the distance-orientation interaction and orientation itself followed suit,
with allocations of 7.5% and 2.5%, respectively.

Figure 10. Belkin PC Card throughput ranges
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4.2.2 USB Dongles

Unlike the PC cards, the USB dongles did not perform similarly to one another.
There is a great difference between the top performer (Hawking) and the bottom
performer (DLink). Some of this difference is likely attributable to the size of the
dongles themselves, as the DLink antenna is considerably smaller than any of the other
devices tested. The differences between the cards are easily distinguishable. The
Hawking card is capable of over 200 kbps at 40 meters. The second best dongle (3Com)
is capable of over 100 kbps at 40 meters. The Belkin device failed beyond 25 meters,
and the DLink antenna was barely usable at 10 meters.
In fact, the manufacturer accounted for the majority of the variance (57.36%) in
the USB group. After that, the variance ranks were comparable to the PC cards, with
distance accounting for 22.87%, the manufacturer-distance combination accounting for
9.76%, and the orientation-manufacturer-distance grouping combining for just 7.67% of
the variation.
4.2.2.1 3Com USB Dongle

The 360 orientation is slightly better than the 90 degree orientation for the 300
kbps level, both achieving it up to 11 meters (see Figure 11). The 270 degree orientation
is also slightly better than the 180 degree orientation at the 200 kbps level, with both
producing those results at 25 meters. All of the orientations are able to transmit above
100 kbps beyond 40 meters, so the distance to failure is unknown. The majority (73.6%)
of the variance comes from the distance between the devices. The distance interacting
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with the orientation accounts for 13.9% of the variation, while the orientation alone is
again inconsequential, contributing to a miniscule 0.1835% of the change.

Figure 11. 3Com USB throughput ranges
4.2.2.2 Belkin USB Dongle

The 270 degree orientation, as shown in Figure 12, is the best here at the 300 kbps
level, producing that throughput at 15 meters. It also dominates the 200 and 100 kbps
levels, achieving each at 19 and 25 meters respectively. All of the orientations failed at
30 meters. The distance is slightly less of a factor, although still a considerable one,
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accounting for 64.7% of the variation in the Belkin USB dongle. The distanceorientation interaction increased to fill that void, providing 27.4% of the variation.

Figure 12. Belkin USB throughput ranges
4.2.2.3 DLink USB Dongle

The relatively abysmal performance (shown in Figure 13) of the DLink antenna is
probably linked to the size of the device. The smallest of all the antennas, it is at least
half the size of the rest of the USB devices. With this small antenna, the gain patterns for
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both transmitting and receiving are diminished. This is likely the reason it was unable to
transmit above 100 kbps, and why only one of the four orientations was successful
beyond 15 meters. If DLink were to create a similar card, with only the antenna size
changed, then this hypothesis could be tested.
The DLink card is unable to achieve throughputs of over 100 kbps at any distance
measured. The only orientation of note is the 360 degree orientation, which has a usable
signal out to 18 meters, whereas the other three orientations failed after 10 meters.
Again, the distance between the devices accounted for the majority of the variation
(74.1%). The distance-orientation interaction accounts for 17.5% of the variation, with
the orientation alone having no significant effect at all on the throughput.

Figure 13. DLink USB throughput ranges
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4.2.2.4 Hawking USB Dongle

Figure 14 reflects the throughput performance of this device. The 90 degree
orientation is slightly better than the 270 degree orientation, both achieving the 300 kbps
level at 24 meters. The 180 degree orientation is the only one not to transmit at the 200
kbps level at 40 meters. All four orientations are capable of at least 100 kbps beyond that
distance; therefore the failure distance is unknown. For the Hawking antenna, 76.6 % of
the variation is attributable to the distance between the devices. The interaction between
the distance and orientation accounts for another 14.3% of the change. Again, the
orientation alone has no effect on the variability.

Figure 14. Hawking USB throughput ranges
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4.3 Summary

This chapter presented the capabilities of seven different Bluetooth devices,
giving both the results of the experiments and an explanation for those results. From
these tests, it is shown that while performance does vary by manufacturer and antenna
type, Bluetooth is capable of over 100 kbps at distances greater than 40 meters. The PC
cards all preformed similarly, likely due to nearly identical size and manufacturing. The
USB dongles varied considerably in performance, likely due to the same manufacturing
differences. The larger dongles performed better while the smallest dongle (DLink) had
the worst capability.
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Chapter Overview

This chapter concludes the research presented in this thesis. A discussion of the
outcome of each research objective is given. This is followed by recommendations for
future work and a summary of the research.
5.2 Conclusions of Research

In developing these usability/vulnerability maps, it is found that for any given
antenna, the distance between devices accounts for the greatest percentage of variation.
This variation falls anywhere between roughly 60-90%. The manufacturing of the device
also plays a significant role, as capabilities varied widely between all seven antennas
tested.
Given that orientation by itself did not prove to be a significant factor for any of
the devices, the usability/vulnerability range of Bluetooth devices appears to be based
upon the distance from the transmitter. In some of these 1 mW devices, a throughput of
over 100 kbps is attainable at distances exceeding 40 meters. This is much greater than
the 10 meter range stated within the Bluetooth specification and advertised by the
manufacturers themselves. Further study of higher power devices may prove this range
to be even greater than reported here.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research

This research accomplished an introductory study into the capabilities of
commercially available Bluetooth devices, with their capabilities measured by the
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throughput attainable at various distances and orientations. Possible further research
topics in Bluetooth are:
o Full factorial analysis of antenna orientations, varying both the transmitter and

the receiver positions.
o Heterogeneous pairing of antennas to determine if any variance can be

attributed to transmitter/receiver differences.
o Performance evaluation of higher power ( > 1 mW) Bluetooth devices
o Performance evaluation of Bluetooth access points
o Evaluation of Bluetooth enabled handheld devices (e.g. PDAs)

5.4 Summary

This research determined a usability/vulnerability range for seven commercially
available Bluetooth devices. This information was derived from experiments varying the
distance between and orientation of two Bluetooth antennas. These throughput maps
provide a first step towards understanding the requirements for implementing a Bluetooth
network in a secure environment, as well as laying a foundation for other research in this
topic area.
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Appendix A – Antenna specifics

This appendix contains the throughput tables and ANOVA charts for each of the
antennas used in the experiment. The hardware details applicable to each antenna are
also provided.
The ANOVA analysis for each card was limited to the distances at which
measurements from each orientation were taken. A more precise analysis of variation
could be possible if every orientation is measured at every distance.
1. 3Com PC Card

The 3Com PC card is operating on version 1.2.0.0 of its Bluetooth software.
Table 3. 3Com PC Card Best Case Throughput Data
Orientation
(degrees)
Distance
(m)

360

90

180

270

5
8
9
10
11
12
15
16
17
20
25
30
35
40

258.1503
X
X
215.1285
202.7748
213.21
152.0778
X
X
181.8778
161.7305
145.1024
104.6987
89.4002

259.3842
X
X
240.8295
X
X
207.2215
192.9869
184.4927
236.2174
166.3749
142.3006
128.3680
94.8932

240.1674
X
X
210.3961
195.5795
130.6046
160.4184
X
X
115.7557
114.0644
133.5164
101.6306
98.0957

245.3112
209.9062
205.6365
211.5306
X
X
194.6324
X
X
138.0750
189.4269
147.7197
105.1203
121.4639
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Table 4. 3Com PC Card ANOVA
Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

DF
7
3
21
64
95

SS
204496.5
9568.093
14394.16
9877.915
238336.7

Mean Square
29213.8
3189.36
685.436
154.342
2508.81

F Ratio
42.6207
4.6530
4.4410

Prob > F
<.0001
0.0120
<.0001

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

Var Component
2377.3630
104.3303
177.0313
154.3424
2813.0671

% of Total Plot%
84.511
3.7088
6.2932
5.4866
100

2. Anycom PC Card

The Anycom PC card is configured as follows:
Table 5. Anycom PC Card Configuration
Installation Package
--------------------------------------------System Release 2.14.221.31
Applications
--------------------------------------------Bluetooth Wizard
- Version: 2.0.0.15
Bluetooth FileTransfer
- Version: 2.0.0.18
Bluetooth PhoneControl
- Version: 2.0.0.18
SppBridge.exe
- Version: 2.0.0.33
Bluetooth Printing
- Version: 2.0.0.22
Libraries
--------------------------------------------hci.dll
- Version: 2.0.0.27
l2cap.dll
- Version: 2.0.0.7
obex.dll
- Version: 2.0.0.10
phonecontrol.dll
- Version: 2.0.0.2
redmonnt.dll
- Version: 1.72.00
rfcomm.dll
- Version: 2.0.0.4
sdp.dll
- Version: 2.0.0.9
wssbt.cpl
- Version: 2.0.0.6
Other
--------------------------------------------Serial Port Emulator (wss_spp.sys) 2.0.0.18
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Sqrt(Var Comp)
48.758
10.214
13.305
12.423
53.038

Table 6. Anycom PC Card Best Case Throughput Data
Orientation
Distance
(m)

360

90

180

270

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
40

310.8796
243.007
226.6161
283.7363
285.868
298.609
X
X
X
X
299.3483
294.4746
242.3778
161.1558
X
X
X
X
202.8758
X
X
151.4826
147.3432
82.56734
X
X
X
X
53.27135
39.58544

312.2726
X
X
X
X
308.6682
297.8212
282.7078
290.7888
268.0415
281.0703
239.6208
241.0136
195.0714
X
X
X
X
183.8906
X
X
X
X
152.3633
68.4913
62.1363
43.3275
49.787
45.02945
Fail

312.1685
245.0786
230.897
222.6044
244.7045
278.9408
272.6598
187.6801
265.5105
237.3033
213.6675
X
X
148.5022
X
X
X
X
157.4685
89.51811
135.6525
X
X
34.64043
X
X
X
X
80.86837
Fail

311.7526
258.2878
236.9687
248.3123
292.2025
298.6771
X
X
X
X
257.0111
X
X
260.1855
227.4422
211.3651
204.0767
188.1176
167.4626
140.4961
141.3022
152.0628
121.2315
100.1096
X
X
X
X
82.51223
Fail
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Table 7. Anycom PC Card ANOVA
Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

DF
7
3
21
64
95

SS
1037623
17084.15
60854.95
4043.098
1119606

Mean Square
148232
5694.72
2897.85
63.1734
11785.3

F Ratio
51.1523
1.9651
45.8714

Prob > F
<.0001
0.1501
<.0001

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

Var Component
12111.172
116.536
944.894
63.173
13235.775

% of Total Plot%
91.5
0.8805
7.1
0.4773
100.0

Sqrt(Var Comp)
110.05
10.80
30.74
7.95
115.05

3. Belkin PC Card

The Belkin PC card operates on Bluetooth software version 1.2.1 and in the
following hardware configuration:

■JIM

Bluetooth Conriguratlon
General

|

Accessibility

Local Services

I

DIsccvery

ClientAppllcallcns

Hardware

|

I nfcrmatlcn Exchange

I Verslcninfc I

Nctlflcatlcns

Devices:
Name

1^

Type

Belkin CardBus Bluetccth Dcngle

PCMCIA

^

rUevice Hcperties

1

Manufacturer:

Cambridge Silicon Radio

Firmware Revision:

Version 115

Device Status This device Is working properly
Device Address:
HCI Version:

00:05:4E:00:E3:AA

Bluetooth HCIl.l

HCI Revision:

0073

LMP Version:

Bluetooth LMP 1.1

LMP Subversion:

0073
Advanced

OK

Cancel

Help

Figure 15. Belkin PC Card hardware configuration
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Table 8. Belkin PC Card Best Case Throughput Data
Orientation
Distance
(m)

360

90

180

270

5
10
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
35
40

295.1521
283.6143
290.7248
X
X
X
X
262.6608
X
X
X
X
218.9668
123.3546
93.71719
121.9789
111.8363
181.4162
72.176
65.7258

310.3502
314.0172
290.107
X
X
X
X
233.1074
64.4844
100.0395
122.6503
95.4178
199.3818
X
X
X
X
124.5304
86.2525
84.0386

304.6213
314.4766
220.3812
197.3695
153.8683
107.0329
X
141.6721
X
X
X
X
150.3807
X
X
X
X
107.3609
69.2656
43.6911

267.5716
295.8986
219.2306
210.6383
204.3826
189.7001
188.1151
199.9294
X
X
X
X
213.6679
121.5646
121.3193
X
X
156.5348
58.939
70.8047

Table 9. Belkin PC Card ANOVA
Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

DF
7
3
21
64
95

SS
719774.9
23652.7
45133.13
2952.128
791512.9

Mean Square
102825
7884.23
2149.2
46.127
8331.71

F Ratio
47.8435
3.6685
46.5930

Prob > F
<.0001
0.0287
<.0001

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

Var Component
8389.6492
238.9599
701.0232
46.1270
9375.7592

% of Total Plot%
89.482
2.5487
7.477
0.492
100
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Sqrt(Var Comp)
91.595
15.458
26.477
6.792
96.829

4. 3Com USB

The 3Com PC card is operating on version 1.2.0.0 of its Bluetooth software.
Table 10. 3Com USB Best Case Throughput Data
Orientation
Distance
(m)

360

90

180

270

5
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
25
30
35
40

302.3882
334.5866
X
X
X
X
230.1000
X
X
X
X
246.0953
195.4834
152.5373
178.2483
144.0456

309.2684
300.4192
X
X
X
X
258.1378
217.2722
209.5633
226.4022
207.4284
238.9243
198.7569
186.9703
169.5994
141.5424

310.5731
223.5487
230.6585
226.7077
X
X
192.1216
X
X
X
X
174.3963
223.8112
181.8987
168.7867
160.3589

278.1970
273.4480
251.3958
221.0531
211.3359
223.9413
173.8494
X
X
X
X
175.8757
254.7388
173.0351
138.1850
130.9853

Table 11. 3Com USB ANOVA
Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

DF
7
3
21
64
95

SS
218214.8
5831.998
37747.97
26260.71
288055.5

Mean Square
31173.5
1944
1797.52
410.324
3032.16

F Ratio
17.3425
1.0815
4.3807

Prob > F
<.0001
0.3785
<.0001

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

Var Component
2448.0019
6.1032
462.3996
410.3236
3326.8283

% of Total Plot%
73.6
0.1835
13.9
12.3
100.0
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Sqrt(Var Comp)
49.477
2.470
21.503
20.256
57.679

5. Belkin USB

The Belkin USB dongle operates on Bluetooth software version 1.3.2.7 and in the
following hardware configuration:
Bluetoolti CdiiAguralian
Genadl AccessU^ | Discoveqi | Locd Seivices | denlAppfcabons Haichvae
Devices:

Hm

JH*

^Bekn Bhetoolh USB Device

USB

- Device Piopeilies
Device Slabjs:

The selected device is woikrig piopeili'.

Maniactuer

CaiJdidge Sicon Ratio

Fimwaie Revision

Vei9cin525

Device Adihess:

00:02:72:40:3F:DB

HGVeisiDn:

BluetoolhHai.1

HG Revision
LMPVeision

020D
BluetoolhLMP1.1

LMPSiiiVeision

020D

OK

Catcd

Applv

Figure 16. Belkin USB hardware configuration
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Table 12. Belkin USB Best Case Throughput Data
Orientation
Distance
(m)

360

90

180

270

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
25
30

299.4144
160.7332
259.321
154.8998
128.4706
164.645
243.8308
121.2005
87.8603
90.4601
55.03324
X
X
X
X
33.79304
18.61885
Fail

284.1751
301.1576
284.2957
253.4432
332.7004
362.6563
313.6036
259.1673
238.8874
205.1956
135.325
118.8457
126.0265
76.1473
81.3496
53.02871
25.03195
Fail

337.0626
292.4248
353.5038
378.1153
313.6787
536.5242
335.2519
271.9598
234.9804
113.5302
147.0657
122.6434
59.5839
65.8017
81.4264
32.41432
47.46183
Fail

318.126
X
X
X
X
277.0843
X
X
X
X
307.0196
227.9333
259.1159
196.2228
269.2253
43.97504
173.7474
Fail

Table 13. Belkin USB ANOVA
Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

DF
4
3
12
40
59

SS
752701.8
97821.12
224885.2
31648.33
1107056

Mean Square
188175
32607
18740.4
791.208
18763.7

F Ratio
10.0411
1.7399
23.6858

Prob > F
0.0008
0.2120
<.0001

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

Var Component
14119.584
924.440
5983.076
791.208
21818.309

% of Total Plot%
64.7
4.2
27.4
3.6
100.0
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Sqrt(Var Comp)
118.83
30.40
77.35
28.13
147.71

6. DLink USB

The DLink USB dongle operates on Bluetooth software version 1.2.2.15 and in
the following hardware configuration:
Bluetoolti CdiiAguralian
Genaal

|

AccessiAv

Local Seivices

|

DiscDveiy

denlAppfccalicini

Haichvaie

|

Infonnabon Exchange

I Vefsionlrfo \

Notifeabons |

Devices:

Hm

Jyp?_

G&D-Lk^DBT-120USBBIuetoolhAd^itei

USB

-Device Piopeilies
Maniactuer

Camfandge Sicon RaiiD

Fimwaie Revision:

Veision 443

Device Slabjs: This device is woikrig piopeili'
Device Ad±ess:
HGVeision:

00:80:C8:35:1G:1F

BhetoothMG 1.1

HG Revision

01BB

LMPVeision:

BluetoolhLMPI.1

LMPSiii Veision

01 BB

^
OK

Catcd

Figure 17. DLink USB hardware configuration
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Table 14. DLink USB Best Case Throughput Data
Orientation
Distance
(m)

360

90

180

270

5
10
15
16
17
18

43.39152
60.87489
27.23608
58.01765
37.2099
51.82118

75.79362
59.94364
Fail
X
X
X

68.14643
47.82668
Fail
X
X
X

66.90015
50.80767
Fail
X
X
X

Table 15. DLink USB ANOVA
Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

DF
2
3
6
24
35

SS
16215.24
173.5196
3120.212
1709.549
21218.52

Mean Square
8107.62
57.8399
520.035
71.2312
606.243

F Ratio
15.5905
0.1112
7.3007

Prob > F
0.0042
0.9504
0.0002

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

Var Component
632.29867
0.00000
149.60135
71.23123
853.13125

% of Total Plot%
74.115
0
17.536
8.3494
100

66

Sqrt(Var Comp)
25.146
0.000
12.231
8.440
29.208

7. Hawking USB

The Hawking USB dongle operates on Bluetooth software version 1.2.2.18 and in
the following hardware configuration:
^^^^^^^xj

1 Bluetooth Conliguratlon
General
Local Services

Acce^^ibilily

Di^coverv

ClienI Applicalion^

Hardware

Inlormalion E-change
Version Inio

Nolilicalion^

Devices
Name

Type

^USB Blueloolh Device

Manulaclurer

USB

Cambridge Silicon Radio

Firmware Revision

^|

Version 373

1

Device Slalu^ Thi^ device i^ working properlv
Device Addre^^
HCI Version

1

_

1

00 EO 98 85 DD 71

Blueloolh HCI 1 1

HCI Revision

0175

LMPVemon

Blueloolh LMP 1 1

LMPSubVemon

"

0175

OK

1

Cancel

Apply

Figure 18. Hawking USB hardware configuration
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Table 16. Hawking USB Best Case Throughput Data
Orientation
Distance
(m)

360

90

180

270

5
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
28
29
30
35
36
37
38
39
40

503.4966
491.7153
328.8407
325.9772
291.3198
325.3945
273.2397
X
X
X
X
270.644
X
X
X
X
236.115
250.6789
207.0178
97.4692
182.2338
X
X
X
X
214.2752

352.8667
424.4977
X
X
X
X
320.9302
310.9543
333.4773
334.6014
326.3672
297.2947
X
X
227.1767
329.9836
205.3973
X
X
225.7809
177.4846
X
X
X
X
244.6589

482.6861
500.9557
338.7356
375.078
343.1358
344.3442
346.4961
332.935
333.6981
309.2662
321.4038
293.7065
X
X
X
X
179.2193
258.2174
224.6431
92.8612
257.244
117.6295
233.0498
291.1436
234.9721
157.798

406.5817
375.2075
X
X
X
X
313.9334
X
X
X
X
316.054
293.368
327.362
299.8671
302.6235
266.7687
X
X
263.6094
229.9656
224.021
258.5334
201.4852
277.8647
207.0786

Table 17. Hawking USB ANOVA
Analysis of Variance
Source
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

DF
7
3
21
64
95

SS
723496.8
13143.24
116159.7
62651.7
915451.5

Mean Square
103357
4381.08
5531.42
978.933
9636.33

F Ratio
18.6854
0.7920
5.6505

Prob > F
<.0001
0.5119
<.0001

Variance Components
Component
Distance
Orient
Distance*Orient
Within
Total

Var Component
8152.106
0.000
1517.494
978.933
10648.534

% of Total Plot%
76.6
0.0
14.3
9.2
100.0
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Sqrt(Var Comp)
90.29
0.00
38.96
31.29
103.19

Appendix B – Merlin Configuration

The following are screenshots of the recording options in Merlin:
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Figure 19. Merlin General Recording Options
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Figure 21. Merlin Events Recording Options
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